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Abstract:I will try to show how Suárez’s 
model of praxis allows for the coordina-
tion of intellect and will to generate actions 
through the integration of ends. A special 
sense of causality is studied that adds a 
practical overlay to actions: while actions 
remain an external mode of the effect, they 
can be contingent insofar as they are pro-
duced by a free agent with particular ends 
in mind. I will argue that the appearance of 
these ends is only possible through a habitual 
understanding of praxis, which is a subjective 
consideration of reality as ‘operable’.
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Resumen: Intentaré mostrar cómo el 
modelo de praxis de Suárez permite la coor-
dinación de intelecto y voluntad para generar 
acciones mediante la incorporación de ﬁ nes. 
Se estudia un sentido especial de causalidad 
que añade a las acciones un revestimiento 
práctico: al tiempo que las acciones siguen 
siendo un modo del efecto, pueden ser 
contingentes en la medida en que están 
producidas por un agente libre con ﬁ nes 
concretos en mente. Argumentaré que la 
aparición de estos ﬁ nes solamente es posible 
mediante una comprensión habitual de la 
praxis, que es una consideración subjetiva de 
la realidad en cuanto ‘operable’.
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I will deal in this paper with the problem of the difference between natural and human actions, and how the latter are the product of the speciﬁ c kind of intellection provided by the habitual sense 
of praxis, which allows for human actions to be free and directed 
towards ends. I will proceed by, ﬁ rst, presenting the ‘instinct-based’ 
action circuit, i.e. the way in which animals move according to the 
internal sense and whether this can be said to be a movement di-
rected towards an end (§1). I will then consider the introduction 
of intellectually-determined ends of actions, ﬁ rst in Aquinas and 
Scotus (§2), and then in Suárez (§3). I will ﬁ nally seek to point out 
exactly how they are introduced by showing how the operational 
sense of praxis actually constitutes agents as such (§4). 
MOVING TOWARDS AN END IN A GENERAL SENSE
In this ﬁ rst section I will describe a general theory of action, appli-
cable to both animals and human beings, as the basic framework on 
which praxis is built upon. Indeed, praxis is a speciﬁ c kind of human 
acting that consists on the ‘addition’ of the intellect and the will, with 
the former specifying and the latter efﬁ ciently exercising it. Now, in 
order for praxis to be conveniently understood, what I call the ‘gen-
eral circuit of action’ may be dealt with here ﬁ rst. The broad form of 
this circuit, as employed by authors like Aquinas, Scotus, and Suárez, 
was basically described by Aristotle in De motu animalium, 7. In Aris-
totle’s account (cfr. Bk 701b 1ff), animal movement may be compared 
to the motion of automatic puppets, controlled by levers and similar 
contraptions, or by the way boys move their toy wagons. Animal bod-
ies have similar parts: organs, bones like levers, string-like sinews, etc. 
Thus, like in natural events, animal movement begins with a change 
of quality: parts of their bodies get warmer or colder, augmenting 
or contracting and bringing, through these shifts, the movement of 
bones and limbs. The change of quality itself is due to “imaginations 
and sensations and ideas”. Movement begins with small changes in 
the center, which then provokes bigger changes in the circumference.
According to C. Rapp, there is no ‘translation’ of desire from a 
pneumatic plane to the material one of kinetic action. Rather,
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[…] in accordance with what I take to be an implication of Ar-
istotle’s ‘hylomorphic’ theory of the soul and with what I take 
to be the most unforced reading of the De Motu Animalium, it 
is not the case that desire somehow acts upon the body and that 
the body is altered accordingly; rather I take it that desire itself 
consists in a characteristic bodily change or rather sequence 
of bodily changes, which starts with the chilling and eating 
that takes place if we see or judge something to be pleasant or 
painful, to be pursued or to be avoided, leads to extension and 
contraction of some inner parts of the body and ﬁ nally makes 
the limbs and then the entire animal move.1
It is also in De motu that Aristotle compares movement to a logic in-
ference. In a syllogism, “the end is the truth seen (for, when one con-
ceives the two premises, one at once conceives and comprehends the 
conclusion), but here the two premises result in a conclusion which is 
an action”.2 Hence we obtain, in a ‘practical syllogism’, an (a) appre-
hensive or cognitive premise —in this text represented as ‘sensations, 
imaginations and ideas’—, and (b) a desiderative premise. 
We could perhaps conclude then that Aristotle holds a “Hu-
mean model” of practical reasoning, which also afﬁ rms that a de-
siderative premise and a cognitive premise must unite in order to 
produce action. However, in the Humean model,
[…] our ends are given by passions (desires). On this view, rea-
son is in the business of producing beliefs, but our beliefs are 
relevant only to the means by which we seek to obtain those 
ends: they do not determine the ends themselves. So, reason 
has only an instrumental use.3
1. C. RAPP, Tackling Aristotle’s Notion of the Will, “Philosophical Inquiry” 41/
2-3 (2017) 67-79: 74. This is an English translation of Αντιμετωπίζοντας την 
αριστοτελική έννοια της βούλησης, en S. EFTHYMIADIS, C. PANAYIDES, P. THANAS-
SAS (eds.), Readings of Aristotle (Nicosia University Press, Nicosia, 2014) 51-69, 
which can be found on his Academia proﬁ le (http://bit.ly/1le0Bgc) (Last access 
23.XI.2015).
2. ARISTOTLE, De motu animalium, 7, Bk 701a 11-12.
3. A. M. SCHMITTER, Hume on the Emotions, en E. N. ZALTA (ed.), The Stanford En-
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In the Aristotelian framework, the cognitive clause is not just 
instrumental but, as we shall see, determining —more so in human 
action, in which we actually determine the end as the speciﬁ cally 
differential element of praxis. The desiderative dimension can only 
be surmised according to the range provided by the cognitive one: 
we can only desire that which we know, insofar as we know it. This 
point is important in that it will later ground discussions about the 
speciﬁ cation of human actions and in the possibility of wishing 
“false” goods, i.e. apparent, or between different possible goods.
This Aristotelian model applies in an analogous and general 
sense to the movement of both animals and humans. In Aristotle, 
this generality makes sense insofar as he doesn’t have a clear con-
ception of a ‘rational appetite’ or will. Thus, in both humans and 
animals
[…] desire, be it rational or not, plays a similar role for the 
self-movement or locomotion of animals. In De Motu and in 
De Anima Aristotle gives us a model according to which move-
ment is initiated by the collaboration of two faculties or two 
families of faculties: the desiderative ones (epithymia, thymos, 
boulêsis) and the discriminative ones, sensual perception, phan-
tasia and nous (thinking).4
The three forms of desire are of course a Platonic heritage, and spe-
ciﬁ cally boulêsis will later on serve to treat human action in greater 
detail:
Boulêsis [is] rational desire or the type of desiring that is con-
nected with reason. Boulêsis or wish, as we may translate it, is 
directed towards the good and is responsive to reason. The 
intellectual and cognitive effort connected with wish is much 
greater than the one connected with non-rational desire, hence 
cyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition) <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
emotions-17th18th/LD8Hume.html> (Last access: 24.XI.2015).
4. C. RAPP, op. cit., 73.
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Aristotle is explicit about the point that only human beings can 
have wish. It follows that Aristotle wants wish to be an essen-
tially rational form of desiring.5 
Suárez also allows for a general treatment of action common to 
both humans and animals. The reason is that action can be deter-
mined from a categorical point of view. Within this approach, all 
actions are ontologically the same: a relational mode of the caused 
being that relates to its cause.6 Both animal and human actions, in 
this sense, can be understood as efﬁ cient causality, and therefore, 
externally, not really different from other natural movements. The 
differential point resides in the mode of an action. Human ac-
tions are contingent because they are voluntary, i.e. free. Still, both 
kinds of actions can examined not from a natural point of view, but 
from a psychology of action framework. Let me turn now to the 
way in which animal actions incorporate ends, and then I will try 
to show how praxis differs in this respect, and how the habitual 
features of praxis allow for the free, contingent mode proper of 
human actions. 
According to Suárez, animal movement follows the object of 
the internal sense. In his Metaphysical Disputation XXIII, section X, 
he states that in order for us to be able to claim that animals move 
themselves because of a ﬁ nal cause, they should be aware of a proper 
order that connects means to ends, an awareness that requires the 
intellect and the will.7 Animals cannot be said to be move themselves 
by a ﬁ nal cause, even if they are directed “towards and end and are 
themselves effects of a ﬁ nal cause.”8 We may even speak of a “meta-
phorical sense of prudence” in animals, because they are
5. Ibidem.
6. For the Suarezian view of action as a category, cfr. M. LECÓN, Metaphysics and 
Psychology of the Making of Law in Francisco Suárez, en K. BUNGE, M. FUCHS, D. 
SIMMERMACHER (eds.), The Concept of Law (lex) in the Moral and Political Thought 
of the ‘School of Salamanca’ (Brill, Leiden, 2016) 249-270.
7. F. SUÁREZ, DM 23.10.1.
8. F. SUÁREZ, DM 23.10.6.
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[…] metaphorically attracted (metaphorice alliciuntur) by a good 
that is convenient and known to them (a bono sibi conveniente et 
cognito); in this way they tend towards it by an act produced by 
them and caused by this metaphorical motion; therefore, such 
a motion is a real causality and this can be no other than ﬁ nal.9 
The expression “metaphorically attracted” is not restricted to ani-
mals: it reappears in Suárez’s Commentary on the De anima referring 
to human action. For animals, the key is that their acts are caused by 
a ﬁ nal cause, but they are not themselves the principle of the ﬁ nal 
cause (the archê is not within them, in Aristotelian terms). Thus, 
they move towards an end they know as convenient and appealing, 
but not as good, for, according to Suárez, knowing the ratio of good 
is a feature of the intellect. 
The concept of good as such involves an ability to relate it to 
our own nature, i.e. we have the sense of why it is a good, and a 
proximate or remote one at that. Animals
[…] do not know the ratio of end or mean, because they can-
not compare (conferre) one to the other; therefore, not even 
in the end itself do they know the reason of convenience, by 
virtue of which [the object] is lovable by itself. Furthermore, 
they cannot discern whether the object is convenient by itself 
or by another. […] And yet they still know in a certain fashion 
and they apprehend a certain thing or motion as convenient to 
them, and with a natural instinct they judge they must appetize 
such an object, or go after it, or run from it.10
This means of course that their perception of good is limited to the 
internal sense. And to this internal sense “the natural appetite is no 
different than the nature or natural faculty: it accompanies it in a 
quasi-formal way, or as a natural consequence. The elicit appetite, 
however, is quite different”.11
9. F. SUÁREZ, DM 23.10.12.
10. F. SUÁREZ, DM 23.1.14.
11. F. SUÁREZ, DM 23.7.5.
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We should thus acknowledge that the natural or simple circuit 
of action is wholly grounded on the imaginative faculty’s cognitive 
power:
Animals know and apprehend some thing or some motion as 
convenient to them. And by the natural instinct they judge it 
as convenient for them, they appetize it, they follow it, or they 
ﬂ ee from such an object. This natural instinct is no other than 
a certain act of the phantasia or the estimative faculty, natu-
rally necessitated by it when the phantasm of a certain thing 
is put forth; and by this practical act (according to the human 
way of speaking) the brutes judge something to be avoided or 
persecuted, or appetized, insofar as they are unable to ration-
ally discern the reason of convenience or inconvenience. And 
when this natural judgement is put forth, so too the appetite 
follows.12
The limits or animal action are set by the formality of the internal 
sense’s cognition: that is why animals cannot apprehend the ratio of 
good, end, means, or the order between them.13 In animal actions, 
the external senses’ objects are uniﬁ ed in the internal sense in such 
a way that they excite the animal’s appetites.14 
But Suárez also emphasizes two points: ﬁ rst, he is careful here 
when attributing cognitive powers to the senses, for it is easy to 
confuse intelligible and merely sensible functions: “as the sense is al-
ways accompanied by the intellect, when the intellects reasons (dis-
currit) around different places and times, the sense goes with it” (DA 
8.1.12). Second, he is clear that the internal sense cannot receive 
any species from the external sense, even if it is dependent on the 
external senses’ actions —just as the agent intellect is dependent on 
the internal sense’s action and yet the latter cannot direct move the 
12. F. SUÁREZ, DM 23.10.14.
13. Suárez reduces the internal senses to a single one, but I will omit that argument 
here. For this matter, see the detailed treatment in DA 8.1 and J. B. SOUTH, Fran-
cisco Suárez on Imagination, “Vivarium” 39/1 (2001) 119-158.
14. See F. SUÁREZ, DA 8.1.9.
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act of the former (i.e. the phantasm is not the efﬁ cient cause of the 
agent intellect’s act).15 It is clear, then, that animal actions cannot 
incorporate a rational conception of good nor can they determine 
any act of the will. 
How then are the rational powers introduced in the circuit of 
actions? By overlaying a conception of beings as goods, i.e. by the 
introduction of bonum over mere entity.
AQUINAS AND SCOTUS ON THE INTELLECT AND THE WILL16
According to Aristotle, human actions require boúlesis (rational 
desire).17 The reasoned action (praxis) thus includes both an intel-
lectually conceived good which provides the focus of this desire, 
and the will as a rational appetite. While animals have no freedom, 
perceive goods/ends according to their senses’ reach, and pursue 
them to the best of their ability until they acquire it or realize it is 
out of reach; human beings, on the other hand, can intend good-
ness beyond the perceptual plane, and can freely initiate an action 
—or not— towards one end or another. (They can move towards 
misconceived ideas of goodness.) Here both the cognitive and the 
desiderative components demand an ampler perspective. Reason 
must be able to present an object as good in a sense that ‘moves’ 
beyond the sensual desire, namely the will, which is capable of self-
determination. 
But even if Aristotle claims human action requires boulêsis, he 
did not seem to have a notion of the “will” as a rational potency;18 
15. See F. SUÁREZ, DA 9.2.12. The main point here is a sharp distinction between the 
intellect’s cognitive powers and those of the senses. Suárez “in effect blocks every 
attempt Thomas makes to enhance the power of the internal sense, reserving 
those extended powers to the intellect. The cogitative power is denied, accord-
ingly, any transitional role in the process of cognition” (J. B. SOUTH, Francisco 
Suárez on Imagination cit., 136).
16. In this section I shall lean on Th. M. OSBORNE, Jr’s recent systematic study, Hu-
man Action in Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham (The 
Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 2014).
17. Cfr. C. RAPP, op. cit., 73. Rapp notes that Cicero rendered boúlesis as voluntas in 
Latin, and Aquinas equalized it with appetitus rationalis.
18. Following Ch. Kahn, Rapp notes that Aristotle indeed considers four instances of 
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Scholastics, on the other hand, possessed a wide array of technical 
terms and models to color prohaíresis. The process involved, broadly 
speaking, a detailed account of what the intellect brings as the cog-
nitive component of action, what the will brings, and the way in 
which these two superior faculties relate to each other, thus map-
ping the “moments” in the genesis of human action. Two of the 
greatest medieval authorities, Aquinas and Scotus, developed such 
an account —though from different perspectives and with similar 
but not equal questions in mind—; Suárez’s position, as usual, aims 
to maintain a careful balance between them. The nuanced positions 
of these authors should at least make us wary of easily-applied labels, 
such as “intellectualist” and “voluntarist”. As Aquinas and Scotus’s 
positions provide the great framework for Suárez, I will delineate 
their positions ﬁ rst and then (§3) look into his doctrine.
For Aquinas, human freedom rests on the intellect insofar as 
only the intellect can know the ratio of the end and how actions can 
be ordered towards it.19
First, the indetermination of free choice results from the intel-
lectual agent’s ability to know different goods in a way that is 
not determined by material conditions. Second, this indeter-
mination allows for reﬂ ection on how ends are instantiated in 
or achieved by means of different acts. Third, the movement 
to the good is controlled by the will, which moves not only the 
intellect but also the other powers of the soul.20 
rational agency —an action that is up to us (eph’ hêmin), an action that is volun-
tary (hekousion), a sense of things that are chosen, and thus result from prohairesis, 
and the desiderative element boulêsis—, and yet lacks a unifying concept for all of 
them, let alone a systematically unifying faculty. Thus, “[In the Nichomachean and 
Eudemian Ethics] Aristotle’s treatment of the voluntary amounts to the following 
thesis: external force and non-culpable ignorance make actions involuntary, and 
‘voluntary’ is just the opposite of ‘involuntary’. (…) In one respect, it seems to 
me, Aristotle nevertheless goes beyond the discussion of excuses - this is when he 
attempts to give a general deﬁ nition of the voluntary. Things are done voluntarily 
or of our own accord, if the archê, the origin of these doings is in us. (…) Later 
prohairesis will be called the archê of actions” (Ibidem, 74).
19. Cfr. THOMAS AQUINAS, II Sent d25 q1 a1, c.
20. TH. M. OSBORNE, op. cit., 8.
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The human will is naturally directed towards the ﬁ nal end, 
happiness, but free agents must choose their particular way to 
achieve it, as no direct good appetized by the will is simply equiva-
lent to happiness.
Aquinas distinguishes two senses of freedom: of exercise and 
of speciﬁ cation. Freedom of exercise depends only on the will; free-
dom of speciﬁ cation consists in the intellect’s determining the ob-
ject of an action. Both senses concur in the action, but each can 
be highlighted to remark the proper place of each faculty. Thus, 
insofar as the ratio of “goodness” is speciﬁ ed by the intellect, then
if some object that is good universally and from every point of 
view is proposed to the will, out of necessity the will tends to 
it, if it wills anything, for it cannot will the opposite. If however 
some object is presented to it that is not good from every point 
of view, the will does not respond to it out of necessity (non ex 
necessitate fertur in illud). […] All other particular goods [aside 
from the perfect good], insofar as they are lacking some good, 
can be regarded as ‘not good,’ and from this point of view they 
can be assented to or rejected by the will, which can respond to 
the same thing according to diverse points of view.21
Here we should note, along with Thomas Williams: 
Interpreters disagree sharply over whether Aquinas thinks the 
will has any power of its own to shape human action or (to put 
the matter in different terms) whether there is any freedom or 
indeterminacy in human volition that is not traceable to the 
intellect. […] Even a small detail like the translation of fertur as 
‹respond› in the following quotation from ST I-II 10.2 is tell-
ing here. […] ‘Respond’ is active: the will does something, or 
doesn’t do something, on its own steam, as it were. But fertur 
is passive. If we translate accordingly —“the will is not drawn 
21. THOMAS AQUINAS, STh I-II q10 a2, c., quoted in Th. M. OSBORNE, op. cit., 11-12, 
trans. Th. GILBY, Summa theologiae vol. 17 (Cambridge University Press, 1964).
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to it out of necessity”— the picture is that the will is carried 
along, or not carried along, to an object depending entirely on 
how the intellect judges it.22
How the will is carried along, at any rate, depends on the ratio of 
good as speciﬁ ed by the intellect. It seems then that only an absolute 
good would “necessitate” the will to act in an unqualiﬁ ed sense, in 
the sense that the natural inclination of the will towards good and 
the speciﬁ cation of an absolute Good would coincide. It is unclear 
whether this determination relates only to freedom of speciﬁ cation 
or if it’s also meant for the will’s freedom of exercise —which, in 
any other case, is of course only dependent on the will itself. Still, 
it is a commonly held thesis that the will is also able to move the 
cognitive potencies, so in a sense the will can lead the intellect to a 
different consideration of something as good, or to a different object 
altogether.23
These margins are important because they lead the theory of 
the four causes into the explanation. Indeed, Aquinas himself seems 
to identify freedom of exercise with an efﬁ cient sense of causality 
(wholly dependent on the will) and freedom of speciﬁ cation with a 
ﬁ nal sense of causality (dependent on the intellect). The introduc-
tion of causal explanatory senses is relevant, for it allows a common 
language of dialogue with Scotus and Suárez. 
Scotus will also identify the intellect’s object with the efﬁ -
cient cause of actions, but not absolutely. Thomas stresses much 
more forcefully the intellect’s capacity to present different rationes 
of goodness. For Scotus, the process seems more straightforward, 
as his consideration employs a different perspective from Aquinas, 
namely by adopting the idea of the two so-called affections of the 
22. Th. WILLIAMS, Review of Thomas M. Osborne Jr., Human Action…, “Notre Dame 
Philosophical Reviews”, 16.VII.2014 (http://ntrda.me/1lfHeTQ). [Last access 
23.XI.2015.]
23. THOMAS AQUINAS, SCG I.72: “voluntas omnem potentiam applicat ad suum ac-
tum; intelligimus enim quia volumus, et imaginamur quia volumus, et sic de aliis. 
Et hoc habet quia obiectum eius est ﬁ nis: —quamvis intellectus non secundum 
modum causae efﬁ cientis et moventis, sed secundum modum causae ﬁ nalis, mo-
veat voluntatem, propenendo sibi suum obiectum, quod est ﬁ nis”.
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will, taken from St. Anselm: the affectio commodi —i.e. the will’s 
movement towards good in a natural sense as an appetizing rational 
faculty—, and the affectio iustitiae —i.e. the formal consideration of 
the will as a free faculty.24
As Thomas Osborne observes: 
For Thomas, the ability to choose between different actions is 
rooted in the intellect’s ability to think about different possible 
goods. In contrast, the distinction between the good in general 
and particular goods does not play the pivotal role in Scotus’s 
account. Scotus thinks that the intellect could grasp the good 
and be determined to it. There are different possibilities pre-
cisely because the will can choose between two options, namely 
the advantageous and the just. The very possibility of an intel-
lectual but not free creature shows that for Scotus freedom is 
rooted not in the intellect but in the will as a rational potency 
with two distinct inclinations.25 
The intellect of course presents different goods, but the critical fac-
tor here seems to be the will’s following of a determination towards 
that which is pleasant, or that which is seen as just.
From a purely logical point of view, freedom in Scotus depends 
absolutely on the will due to its capacity for self-determination.26 
Scotus seems to emphasize ‘freedom of exercise’ to a greater de-
gree than Aquinas, following his idea that the will retains the power 
to will the opposite of an act in the same instant as it is willing it 
(a feature scholars commonly deﬁ ne as synchronic contingency).27 So, 
for Scotus, we “do not call something contingent because it is not 
24. Cfr. C. GONZÁLEZ AYESTA, Duns Scotus on the Natural Will, “Vivarium” 50 (2012) 
33-52.
25. Th. M. OSBORNE, op. cit., 27.
26. See E. STUMP, Obligations: From the Beginning to the Early Fourteenth Century, en 
N. KRETZMANN et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982), ch. 16, Part A, 315-334.
27. Cfr. S. DUMONT, The Origin of Scotus’s Theory of Synchronic Contingency, “Modern 
Schoolman” 72 (1995) 149-167.
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always or necessarily the case, but because its opposite could be 
actual at the very moment when it occurs.”28 
Scotus’s more radical defense of the will as the formal cause of 
freedom entails the clariﬁ cation that the intellect’s ability to think 
about different possible goods is not enough to formally speak of 
freedom (following the ﬁ ctional account of Anselm’s De casu diaboli, 
Scotus argues that a created intellect moved only by the affectio com-
modi would be able to think about different goods, and yet their 
choices would not be free). The affectio iustitiae is the proper per se 
cause of freedom.29
Still, Scotus is also bound to hold that the intellect speciﬁ es 
action in the sense of an efﬁ cient cause, because without an object 
the will would be blind.30 Thus, 
[…] in the Lectura, Scotus takes a middle view between two 
positions. The ﬁ rst one claims that the cause of the will’s ac-
tivity is the known object, and the second is that the known 
object is merely a cause that is sine qua non. The ﬁ rst position 
was held in different ways by Godfrey of Fontaines and others, 
whereas the second was held by Henry of Ghent and many in 
the Franciscan tradition.31 
Scotus will argue that the object is a partial efﬁ cient cause or co-
cause of action, while the will is the principal efﬁ cient cause. 
On his Paris reportationes there is a change in terminology, even 
if his basic position seems to remain the same. Scotus now defends 
the will as the total determining efﬁ cient cause of the act, but he 
seems to adopt Henry’s terminology and claims the object can be 
understood as a sine qua non cause in the sense of a partial efﬁ cient 
cause, which amounts to considering it an efﬁ cient cause per accidens. 
On the later Ordinatio IV he seems to endorse both possibilities. At 
any rate, he always claimed that the will is the total efﬁ cient cause. 
28. DUNS SCOTUS, Ord I d2 1ª, qq1-2, 86.
29. DUNS SCOTUS, Lectura II d25, 33.
30. DUNS SCOTUS, Lectura II d25, 78: “…liberum arbitrium esset caecum”.
31. Th. M. OSBORNE, op. cit., 32.
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He considers the possibility that the object moves metaphorically as 
a ﬁ nal and not efﬁ cient cause, but he does not endorse the position. 
I believe all these positions merely amount to one of his rules 
for essential order: it is possible for A to cause B but only after C. In 
this case, it is possible for the will to be the total efﬁ cient cause of a 
volition but only after the intellect has determined the mind towards 
a concrete good.
SUÁREZ’S NOTION OF PRAXIS
Final causality is actually the sense Suárez assigns to the intellec-
tual component of action: it is precisely the object presented by the 
intellect as a convenient good the one that speciﬁ es human action. 
Thus, the object is required by the act, and yet it does not take any-
thing away from the will’s freedom of exercise, i.e. from the will as 
the total per se efﬁ cient cause.32
Suárez carefully distinguishes sensible and intellectual knowl-
edge: 
There is a great difference between sense and intellect because 
sense stops at (sistere) the cognition of sensible external acci-
dents. Intellect, however, does not stop there but from the cog-
nition of accidents it advances to contemplating those realities 
that are concealed (latere) under the accidents. And therefore 
it is called ‘intellect’ as from ‘reading within’.33 
In this sense, it acts as a ﬁ nal cause for the will’s action. So, while 
necessary and determinant for the will’s movement, the object is 
not, strictly speaking, the efﬁ cient cause. “And the reason of this
32. On the distinction between these two senses of causality and the distinction be-
tween the motivation and the self-determination of the agent cfr. T. PINK, Suarez, 
Hobbes and the scholastic tradition in action theory, en T. PINK, M. STONE (eds.), The 
Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day (Routledge, London, 
2004) 127-153.
33. F. SUÁREZ, DA 9.4.1.
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is that ﬁ nal causality consists in a metaphorical motion of the will, 
which is enticed towards it”.34
The metaphorical motion of the will is precisely the object 
from the viewpoint of ﬁ nal causality. Thus, as Sidney Penner writes:
In order for the will to be attracted to an end, the intellect must 
cognize the end and present it to the will. Since the intellect 
can think about things that do not exist, the intellect can pre-
sent objects that currently exist only in the mind to the will. 
This is why ﬁ nal causes, unlike efﬁ cient causes, do not need 
real existence in order to cause. This does not mean, however, 
that the ﬁ nal cause in truth is the mental entity. […] But once 
the intellect presents a good object —really existing or not, 
genuinely good or not— to the will, that object is attractive 
to the will. The will can then produce an act of love for the 
object. Assuming that the will does so, there is an instance of 
actualized ﬁ nal causality.35
Suárez presents this motion as a holistic uniﬁ ed process, which can 
only analytically understand efﬁ cient and ﬁ nal causality as separated 
components: 
One and the same action of the will is caused by the end and 
by the will itself. It is effective causality insofar as it is caused 
by the will and it is ﬁ nal causality insofar as it is caused by the 
end. And for the former reason it is a real and proper motion, 
because such an action ﬂ ows from the power as from a proper 
physical principle, but for the latter reason it is a metaphorical 
motion, because it ﬂ ows from an object enticing and drawing 
the will to itself.36
34. F. SUÁREZ, DM 23.5.2.
35. S. PENNER, “Final Causality: Suárez on the Priority of Final Causation” cit., 129.
36. F. SUÁREZ, DM 23.4.7.
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We need not take “metaphorical motion” as if it were an apparent, 
false, or merely hypothetical motion. Following Penner, it can be 
cautiously assumed to be a technical term relating to the difference 
between efﬁ cient motion and the kind of motion speciﬁ c to the ﬁ nal 
cause. The ﬁ nal cause is a non-physical way of moving. We speak 
then of an analogical motion, that does not directly relate to the 
notiora idea of motion as we directly attest in nature as an efﬁ cient 
cause, so that even if this motion 
[…] is called metaphorical, [it is] not because it is not real, 
but because it does not happen through effective inﬂ ux nor 
through physical motion but through intentional and animal 
motion. And therefore nothing prevents it from being the case 
that its causality is true and proper.37
It can readily be seen that proper refers here to efﬁ cient causality 
insofar as it resembles a proper physical principle; we’ve seen that, in 
terms of its categorical determination, all actions are natural move-
ments. ‘Free’ is just a mode of some of these actions. Therefore free 
actions are natural actions, but ones whose efﬁ ciency begins with 
the will. As ‘action’ is a mode of the effect, it is no less an action 
than any other, even if its mode is called ‘contingent’ because its 
source is the will. 
In this action model, ﬁ nal causality as the origin of actions ex-
ists properly only in rational agents. Animals do not choose their 
ends, even if they cognize it as somehow desirable; natural beings 
are involved in no appetizing whatsoever: their actions are just so 
modelled that their form elicits efﬁ cient activity as directed towards 
a pre-deﬁ ned goal. What changes then is not action as something 
real, but the mode of action as a relation to its source potency. 
Suárez expresses this by saying that natural agents are “habituated” 
towards a ﬁ nal cause, but they are not themselves properly con-
37. F. SUÁREZ, DM 23.1.14; cfr. S. PENNER, op. cit., 135. It can readily be seen that 
proper refers here to efﬁ cient causality insofar as it resembles a proper physical prin-
ciple; we’ve seen that, in terms of its categorical determination, all actions are 
natural movements. ‘Free’ is just a mode of some of these actions. 
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cerned with a ﬁ nal cause (“a naturalibus agentibus non sit propria 
causalitas ﬁ nalis, sed solum habitudo ad certum terminum”: DM 
23.10.6). Their actions are moved according to ﬁ nal causalities as 
externally caused by God.38 
How are the intellect and the will ordered in the production of 
external actions? According to Suárez, the intellect provides a rule 
for the will, and the will is the principle of exercise insofar as it is 
self-determined.39 
a) The intellect is the rule of the will following its capacity 
to apprehend the ratio of good —an exclusive feature of rational 
agents. As the intellect grounds the openness to opposites (“objec-
tive indifference”), the will’s own indifference towards them, which 
allows it to freely self-determine itself, depends on the intellect. The 
intellect’s objective indifference means that 
[the intellect] suggests different rationes of convenience and 
inconvenience, and in a similar manner doesn’t always sug-
gests a means as necessary but as indifferent, insofar as besides 
discerning its degree of utility and difﬁ culty, at the same time 
it discovers or suggests other means; that is why it is the funda-
ment of the will’s free choice.40 
Suárez therefore considers reason as the “root of freedom”, even if 
the formal ratio of freedom is in the will.41 Suárez believes this is in 
line even with Scotus’s radical defense of the freedom of the will, 
and when Duns speaks of the intellect as a necessary condition for 
freedom, not as root, this is “because he worries more about the way 
of speaking than about the doctrine.”42 This entails that the intellect 
38. Cfr. F. SUÁREZ, DM 23.10.6.
39. Cfr. A. VIGO, Intelecto, deseo y acción en Francisco Suárez, en J. CRUZ (ed.), Razón 
práctica y derecho. Cuestiones ﬁ losóﬁ co-jurídicas en el Siglo de Oro español (Eunsa, Pam-
plona, 2011) 15-23.
40. F. SUÁREZ, DM 19.5.22.
41. F. SUÁREZ, DM 19.5.11-20. See also J.-P. COUJOU, Causalité libre et moralité de 
l’action chez Suárez, en C. GONZÁLEZ AYESTA, R. LÁZARO (eds.), Causality in Early 
Modern Philosophy (Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 2013) 89-98. 
42. F. SUÁREZ, DM 19.5.21.
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is not formally free;43 still, “this does not work against the intellect’s 
perfection, which in absolute terms consists in being the rule of the 
will”.44 Indeed, Suárez holds that as rule of the will the intellect can-
not be free, for rules must be certain and immutable, and not inclined 
towards the matter of regulation, but rather adequate themselves to 
it in a determinate way.45 The will, on its part, is blind without its 
rule. For Suárez, “no potency whose act is not intrinsically voluntary 
can be formally free according to exercise.”46 Suárez is here follow-
ing Scotus: natural agents as those whose active potency elicits their 
act in presence of their object (passo approximate) if there is no im-
pediment: “the intellect cannot be in any way indeterminate towards 
its object if not because an imperfect presentation of the object. The 
will, on the other hand, even before an object exactly presented to 
it, can remain indifferent.”47 Still, Suárez holds that the intellect’s 
indifference means that in an absolute sense the intellect is more 
perfect than the will because it is more simple and abstract.
b) In DM 23.4.7 Suárez allows for a double consideration of 
action: while it can be considered according to ﬁ nal causality as 
moved by the end (the object presented by the intellect), it can also 
be appreciated according to efﬁ cient causality as the will’s act. The 
understanding of action according to efﬁ cient causality depends on 
the will as a self-determining principle, a complex doctrine Suárez 
explores at length in the De voluntario et involuntario. We may brieﬂ y 
relate here that the will’s self-determination is possible because 
every elicit act includes a virtual, reﬂ exive “sub-act” that allows the 
will to choose an object according to the mode of the act and not 
to the mode of the object.48 This means that the will can freely 
43. Cfr. F. SUÁREZ, DM 19.5.24.
44. F. SUÁREZ, DM 19.5.25.
45. This is repeated in DM 19.5.13: “The intellect is not free neither in the speciﬁ ca-
tion nor in the exercise of its act”; “it is determined by its nature to assent to truth 
and to dissent to falseness; and if the object presents neither of these rationes, or 
the intellect is incapable of grasping them, it cannot realize any act because it can-
not act without its object.”
46. F. SUÁREZ, DM 19.5.17.
47. F. SUÁREZ, DM 19.5.15.
48. F. SUÁREZ, De voluntario et involuntario 1.1.2. And in 1.1. 6: “esse voluntarium in 
actu elicito, nihil aliud esse quem esse actum, ita immediate manentem a volun-
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determine itself towards an object only because it determines itself 
as determined towards that object. According to Suárez, animals are 
unable to be subjects of the law because they cannot self-determine 
themselves and thus their will cannot be normatively determined.49
In sum: by understanding the object as a ﬁ nal cause and pre-
senting an ordered view of the part played by the intellect and the 
will, Suárez seems to have acknowledged both Aquinas and Scotus’s 
positions, upholding their main thesis (the act is only exercised by 
the will, but the will’s act needs an object to direct it) without un-
dermining their particular roles. The intellect provides a rule that 
the will can intend; this rule acts as a metaphorical end that the 
will may achieve by employing its dominion over the bodily facul-
ties. The rule provided by the intellect is an object seen as adequate 
to our human nature: this adequation is what the will perceives as 
good. Praxis hinges on the intellect’s view, for “according to the 
way in which the intellect perceives everything in its own degree 
of goodness or malice, so can the will love according to that degree 
of goodness.”50 This whole complex operation is what Suárez calls 
praxis, the ﬁ rst habit of the practical intellect.
Regarding transcendental goodness, Suárez is careful to defend 
that it identiﬁ es with a being’s proper perfection, and is not primo 
per se a relational feature. Suárez argues against bonum being a “rela-
tion of convenience”, a “real relation superaddita to a being”, a “cer-
tain absolute and real property”, or “a real intrinsic perfection”;51 he 
rather argues that bonum “only adds to being a ratio of convenience 
which is not a proper relation, but only connotes in another a nature 
to which it has a natural inclination, capacity, or connection with 
such a perfection. Therefore, bonitas is said of the same perfection 
of the thing.”52 This openness of perfection is what allows the intel-
tate, ut per se ipsum intrinsece sit volitus per virtualem et intrinsecam reﬂ exio-
nem in ipso inclusam”.
49. F. SUÁREZ, De legibus I, I, 2: “res carentes ratione non sunt proprie capaces legis, 
sicut nec obedientiae”.
50. F. SUÁREZ, DA 12.2.10. 
51. F. SUÁREZ, DM 10.1 ff.
52. F. SUÁREZ, DM 10.1.12: “bonum supra ens solum posse addere rationem con-
venientiae quae non est proprie relatio, sed solum connotat in alio talem natu-
DAVID GONZÁLEZ GINOCCHIO
390 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 50/2 (2017) 371-396
lect to provide an adequation towards a good, while keeping with 
the will’s freedom.53
PRAXIS AS A HABIT
How can the intellect provide a rule for the will while respecting 
its freedom of exercise? Suárez’s notion of praxis is revealing in this 
sense: its deﬁ nition may help to assess the relation between the in-
tellect and the will; its status as a habit provides the framework to 
understand the peculiar mode of free actions. 
In the ﬁ rst regard, the deﬁ nition of praxis provides a systemati-
cal fundament for the intellect-will relation. We have sketched the 
main order of these faculties, with the intellect providing a rule and 
the will the exercise: 
The intellect is the one that directs the will and even man it-
self, for the exercise of an operation certainly requires freedom, 
but the correctness of that operation comes from the intellect. 
Therefore, we cannot deny that these faculties do bring among 
themselves a certain order and collaborate mutually, but the 
will has a bigger dependence on the intellect than the other 
way around.54 
More speciﬁ cally, Suárez works with Scotus in mind in DM XLIV.55 
Scotus deals with this question when commenting the Aristotelian 
notion of praxis in his commentary on Book IX of the Metaphysics; 
indeed, in a way he is actually re-deﬁ ning praxis, since he argues 
ram habentem naturalem inclinationem, capacitatem, vel coniunctionem cum tali 
pefectione; unde bonitas dicit ipsam perfectionem rei, connotando praedictam 
convenientiam seu denotationem consurgentem ex coexistentia plurium”.
53. For a thorough study on the bonum see R. DARGE, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsau-
slegung und die Metaphysiktradition (Brill, Leiden, 2004) 313 ff.
54. F. SUÁREZ, DA 12.XII, q3, 7.
55. On Scotus’s inﬂ uence on Suárez cf. C. GONZÁLEZ AYESTA, Sobre el “escotismo” de 
Suárez: el caso de la causalidad de la especie, en A. ECHAVARRÍA, J. F. FRANCK (eds.), 
La causalidad en la ﬁ losofía moderna (Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de 
Navarra, Pamplona, 2012) 9-16.
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Aristotle did not conceive the will as a distinct faculty.56 The Subtle 
Doctor distinguishes natural and rational potencies, but he argues 
that their difference doesn’t depend on their possible objects (i.e. 
that they can act “over this or that object”), but rather in their very 
acts: “according to the operation through which it elicits the object 
in such a way or another”.57 According to Scotus, there are only 
two ways to elicit an operation. The ﬁ rst way is called “nature”; it 
consists in “operating in such a way that it can’t by itself stop operat-
ing unless it is externally impeded”. The other way is called “will” 
(voluntas), and it signiﬁ es a potency that “by itself can perform this 
act or its opposite, and even act or not”.58
56. As Aristotle had no equivalent notion of the will as a different potency, let alone 
a superabundant power that can determine itself, Scotus refers the intellect/will 
difference to their proper acts, and to the acts of the inferior potencies they cause. 
The intellect’s act should then be redirected to the instances in which Aristotle 
refers to the principle that presents and guides (ostendendo et dirigendo), and the 
will to the principle that inclines and appetizes (inclinando et imperando). See DUNS
SCOTUS, In IX Metaph 15.36: “Responsio: intellectus et voluntas possunt compa-
rari ad actus proprios quos eliciunt, vel ad actus aliarum potentiarum inferiorum 
in quibus quandam causalitatem habent: intellectus ostendendo et dirigendo, vol-
untas inclinando et imperando. Prima comparatio est essentialior, patet. Et sic 
intellectus cadit sub natura. Est enim ex se determinatus ad intelligendum, et non 
habet in potestate sua intelligere et non intelligere sive circa complexa, ubi potest 
habere contrarios actus, non habet etiam illos in potestate sua: assentire et dis-
sentire. In tantum quod si etiam aliqua una notitia sit oppositorum cognitorum, 
ut videtur Aristoteles dicere, adhuc respectu illius cognitionis non est intellec-
tus ex se indeterminatus; immo necessario elicit illam intellectionem, sicut aliam 
quae esset tantum unius cogniti. Voluntas ad proprium actum eliciendum op-
posito modo se habet, ut dictum est prius.– Unde isto modo loquendo ponuntur 
tantum duae productiones in divinis, et quod intellectus est idem principium cum 
natura.– Secundum hanc primam comparationem non videtur loqui Aristoteles.”
57. DUNS SCOTUS, In IX Metaph 15.21: “De primo sciendum est quod prima dis-
tinctio potentiae activae est secundum diversum modum eliciendi operationem: 
quod enim circa hoc vel illud agat (etsi aliquo modo distinguat), aut distinctionem 
ostendat, non tamen ita immediate. Non enim potentia ad obiectum, circa quod 
operatur, comparatur nisi mediante operatione quam elicit, et hoc sic vel sic.”
58. DUNS SCOTUS, In IX Metaph 15.22: “Iste autem modus eliciendi operationem 
propriam non potest esse in genere nisi duplex. Aut enim potentia ex se est de-
terminata ad agendum, ita quod, quantum est ex se, non potest non agere quando 
non impeditur ab extrinseco. Aut non est ex se determinata, sed potest agere hunc 
actum vel oppositum actum; agere etiam vel non agere. Prima potentia commu-
niter dicitur ‘natura’, secunda dicitur ‘voluntas”.
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There is no “cause” for this difference; this is just the way po-
tencies are.59 The will is by nature undetermined to any object, and 
moves towards a speciﬁ c one according to a “superabundance of suf-
ﬁ ciency, which is an illimitation for actuality”,60 it is an “indetermi-
nate potency that can determinate itself”, a potency that is “active, 
excellent in perfection and power, and not linked to a determined 
act”. 61 Suárez follows this view, making way for a ‘virtual act of the 
will’ so that its self-determination actually means determining itself 
towards a determinate act.
The intellect’s knowledge of opposite is not a sufﬁ cient cause for 
free actions; otherwise, both effects would be produced. The intel-
lect is ‘rational’ only secundum quid, “insofar as it is a requisite for the 
act of the rational faculty,”62 namely, the will. It is the will that al-
lows for external actions, even determining “the intellect according 
to the causal power it has to operate externally.”63 What Aristotle 
calls prohairesis, must be understood as referring to the will.64 
59. DUNS SCOTUS, In IX Metaph 15.24: “Sicut enim effectus immediatus ad causam 
immediatam comparatur per se et primo et sine causa media —alioquin iretur in 
inﬁ nitum—, ita causa activa ad suam actionem, in quantum ipsam elicit, videtur 
immediatissime se habere. Nec est dare aliquam causam quare sic elicit nisi quia 
est talis causa”.
60. DUNS SCOTUS, In IX Metaph 15.31: “Responsio: est quaedam indeterminatio 
insufﬁ cientiae, sive ex potentialitate et defectu actualitatis, sicut materia non 
habens formam est indeterminata ad agendum actionem formae; est alia supera-
bundantis sufﬁ cientiae, quae est ex illimitatione actualitatis, vel simpliciter vel 
quodammodo”.
61. Cfr. DUNS SCOTUS, In IX Metaph 15.32 & 15.34.
62. DUNS SCOTUS, In IX Metaph 15.38.
63. DUNS SCOTUS, In IX Metaph 15.39: “Sequitur voluntas determinans, non sic quod 
ipsa potentia voluntatis ex se determinata sit ad unum —et per hoc aggregatum 
ex intellectu oppositorum et voluntate sit unius, ut supra allegatur— sed quod 
voluntas, quae indeterminata est ad actum proprium, illum elicit et per illum de-
terminat intellectum quantum ad illam causalitatem quam habet respectu ﬁ endi 
extra”.
64. Cfr. DUNS SCOTUS, In IX Metaph 15.40 & 15.41. “On the other hand, why does 
he always talk of the intellect and not of the will as a rational faculty, even if he 
insinuates it, according to what we have said? We could say that the act of the in-
tellect is normally previous to the act of the will, and more noticeable to us. Aris-
totle often speaks of that which is more manifest, and therefore he says little of the 
will, even if we can assume from his words that he would have said some things 
if he had considered it” (In IX Metaph 15.53). We may here acknowledge Rapp’s 
conclusion: even if Aristotle does not explicitly speak of the will, he nevertheless 
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Suárez acknowledges the different roles of the intellect (rule) 
and the will (exercise); still, he mildly reformulates the notion of 
praxis. First, he acknowledges Scotus’s deﬁ nition: “Praxis is the act of 
a potency different to the intellect, naturally posterior to intellection, 
destined by nature to be realized in conformity with right reason so 
that it may be right.”65 He then goes on to say that according to this 
deﬁ nition, praxis may also be an act of the intellect if directed by a 
previous act of the same intellect (n. 24). This would entail that the 
proper ratio of praxis is the guidance of a faculty in its operation; 
it would also mean that praxis does not have to refer to a different 
faculty than the intellect. Thus, the intellect becomes a true rule for 
praxis. His ﬁ nal deﬁ nition of praxis is that it is “any human or rational 
action, insofar as it is directed, or is dirigible or regulable by human 
reason”.66 (When the action is dirigible in a moral sense, it is called 
praxis; when it is dirigible according to art, it is called production.)67
Of course, this places praxis again in the realm of the intellect, 
as the true root of freedom; more speciﬁ cally, as the disposition to 
direct rational moral actions. In my opinion, it is precisely this locus 
—praxis as an intellectual practical habit— what ultimately allows 
the introduction of ends into human actions.68 In this arrangement, 
praxis can be seen as a habit concerning practical reason, i.e. within 
the framework of practical truth. This is the proper setting for 
Suárez’s theory of law, and helps to temperate the idea of Suárez’s 
as a “voluntarist”. 
seems to consider a lot of the necessary components for a theory of the will: “[he] 
relates the two topics, the topic of the voluntary and the topic of the prohairesis 
by saying that the voluntary is broader than the chosen, i.e. there are cases of the 
voluntary in which nothing is chosen or, in the terminological sense of boulêsis, 
wished for. He mentions animals and children who act or do what they are doing 
voluntarily without being able to terminologically choose it. Furthermore, in the 
case of adult human beings it happens that they do things spontaneously without 
considering them beforehand.” (C. RAPP, op. cit., 75).
65. F. SUÁREZ, DM 44.13.20.
66. F. SUÁREZ, DM 44.13.28.
67. Cfr. F. SUÁREZ, DM 44.13.29.
68. T. PINK, Suarez, Hobbes cit., 152: “Suarez’s theory of ﬁ nal causation is an attempt 
to model normative power for the practical sphere; and his theory of free efﬁ cient 
causation is an attempt to model freedom”.
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According to Aristotle in bk. VI of the Nichomeachean Eth-
ics, praxis is an intellectual habit. It is a way of seeing or cognizing 
things as subject to practical deliberation. Through praxis, we do 
not consider the order of things as it is, but as objects of action 
dependent on a contingent will. Since real action is in line with ef-
ﬁ cient causality, the will’s act does not always necessarily follow in 
reality. But their contingency depends on the will determining itself 
towards an end, a possible good, provided by the intellect. While 
the will’s exercise is thus safeguarded as the formal ratio of freedom, 
the provision of a cognized possibility for actions sits at the begin-
ning of actions. Freedom depends then on the intellect’s ability to 
devise courses of action, i.e. of seeing the world as the realm of 
possibilities: not of things as necessary, but of things as operable.69 
This ﬁ nal determination comes at the very end of DM XLIV. 
In section 13 nn. 31 ff., Suárez discusses the distinction between 
theoretical and practical habits of the intellect. In the beginning, 
Suárez argues against the opinion that divides them based on their 
material object i.e. that the theoretical habit is about de re non op-
erabile a nobis, and the practical de re operabile.70 This is insufﬁ cient 
because we can actually speculate about operable realities. Others 
take this same objects in a more formal sense (haec distinguunt ex ei-
sdem obiectis formalius sumptis): in this case, a practical science would 
be the one which actually teaches how to operate with objects. The 
difference would here be in the end of each habit: “the speculative 
habit ultimately stops [sistit] in the knowledge of truth, while the 
practical one tends towards the operation.”71 In the end, the mate-
rial object ends up being determined by the habit’s goal. Now a 
possible question would consider if the goal of the habit is to actu-
ally consider an external practical action, or whether it is enough for 
it to consider operable objects. For example: if an architect learns 
how to build a house, is his consideration actually practical or is it 
only so when he is actually designing a house? If the actual opera-
69. Cfr. ARISTOTLE, Eth. Nic. 1139a 5-15.
70. Cfr. F. SUÁREZ, DM 44.13.34.
71. Ibidem.
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tion determined the end of the habit, we would ﬁ nd ourselves with 
the possibility that “the sole change of intention would turn the one 
same habit from practical to speculative, and viceversa.”72
In the end, Suárez will hold that a practical science, by its own 
nature, is not constituted by the subject’s disposition (“for, even if 
I were to learn natural philosophy or metaphysics with the inten-
tion of making money, or of pleasing my will, that does not of itself 
make those sciences practical.”)73 Rather, a science is practical if it 
“deals by its own nature with operable things insofar as they are op-
erable, so that by itself it eases action; such a science is intrinsically 
practical.”74 The subject’s disposition for action belongs to the “per-
fectum illum statum scientiae practicae,” but even this necessarily 
“presupposes that the science itself is ordained towards operations 
or is regulative of operations.”75
The ﬁ nal point of this paper appears in DM 44.13.38. Here 
Suárez holds, following Aristotle, that the distinction between the 
practical and the theoretical habit, between the intellect that re-
mains in the truth and the one that is directed towards actions, does 
not depend on the intent of the will, but “convenes of itself to the 
intellect ut antecedit voluntatem. From here, it turns out that the in-
tellect does not make itself practical by an intention of the will, but 
it is itself, insofar as it is practical, the one that moves and modiﬁ es 
the will”. So in the end, the practical and theoretical intellect “may 
both elicit their own acts, and it is through them that these are 
practical or speculative, and not only through the intent of the will.”
To sum up: human actions differ from natural or even animal 
actions insofar as they incorporate ends as such into themselves. 
The intellect’s representational priority sets up the end of an action, 
while the will elicits the action through its power for self-determi-
nation. While the will is not determined in its own exercise by the 
intellect, a simple voluntarist account of action does not justly rep-
resent Suárez’s view, as the Doctor Eximius maintains the necessity of 
72. F. SUÁREZ, DM 44.13.36.
73. F. SUÁREZ, DM 44.13.37.
74. Ibidem.
75. Ibidem.
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the intellect’s acquisition of the good to ground the will’s freedom. 
However, the way the intellect brings about this concept of good-
ness is not simply a result of its greater cognitive power against that 
of the interior sense: indeed, it is only insofar as the intellect con-
templates operable things as such that the realm of possibilities for 
action opens up. The consideration of the practical habit as a way of 
looking at objects (turning them into operabilia) seems therefore to 
be the critical point that allows the will to relate to its proper object 
(bonitas, as an object set by the intellect as a rule, i.e. as an object the 
will can self-determine itself to adequate to) and to desire goods. In 
other words: the intellect, as capable by praxis of looking into opera-
bilia, is what ultimately allows for the possibility of introducing our 
own determinate ends into external actions.
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